
The strategic impact of shale and renewables and gaining confidence in higher oil prices *An European perspective*

> JP Morgan Center for Commodities Denver Business School, Colorado Jan-Hein Jesse 27 April, 2016

> > JOSCO Energy Finance & Strategy Consultancy


The thesis for this presentation





... and would that leave no other option for the major giant producers than to go for market share and volume strategy?

Setting the scene: The European fossil energy imports in 2014




Primary energy consumption in Germany in 2015 and the impact of the Energie Wende



Germany's electricity generation mix 2015 Primary energy consumption mix in Share of Germany's gross electric power Germany 2015? generation in petajoules & percent Source: AGEB. AGEE-Stat Natural gas Others Renewables 30% = 194 bn kWh 0.5% 8,8% Othe Natural gas 2.3% Hydro power 0.5% 14,1% Lignite Nuclear 11.9% Wind power Wind 0.2% Solar power 0.4% Solar thermal Hard coal 647 Renewables 13.335 PJ 12.7% Geothermal 12.6% 30% in 2015 Waste bn kWh 24% Lignite 7,7% Biofuels Biomass Nuclear Biomass 7.5% Petroleum Solar PV 18,2% 33.8% 3% Hydropower Hard coal


Renewables reach 30% of Germany's gross electric power generation

Future oil demand and the electrification of cars



While Bernstein forecasts EV sales to reach 10% of total car sales by 2025, Goldman Sachs forecasts that vehicles with an electric powertrain system will account for 25% of global auto sales in 2025, up from 5% in 2015, driven by Europe and California







Three key changes as a consequence of the decisions taken during the OPEC meeting on 27 Nov 2014

- 1. Saudi Arabia: Not the Central Oil Bank any longer
- 2. The end of "the call on OPEC crude"
- 3. The Battle between the Giants

Volume for Value strategy and tactics to outmaneuver the competition

Oil policy is not constant and there is no desired oil price (the oil price is a moving target depending on market conditions)




Brent crude oil price vs. the marginal and cash cost of the barrel



A 35 dollar bandwidth to play with

Volume Strategy at work








US Lower-48 States (excl. GOM)

Volume Strategy has stopped non-OPEC from growing, but shale oil is not really a swing producer as -1mln b/d swing takes 12 months and most likely another 24 months for a full return

OPEC surplus crude oil production capacity




But what if OPEC disappoints like in the early 2000s, will the world then run out of capacity ?




Official spare capacity excl. Iran is 1.5 mln b/d, all concentrated in Saudi Arabia, where the crown price recently said he could produce 1 mln b/d if there was demand

Do we have to plan for a final super-cycle in the next decade? And can we expect spikes even earlier?






.... While the industry continues to be faced by Black Swans



Source: JOSCO, April 2016

The three categories of oil – where is supply growing? What is needed?







Cumulative Quantity (million barrels per day)

Growing the envelope of new oil supply, increasingly more onshore, increasingly more of cheap oil and medium-priced oil

At prices below \$ 50/bbl most of the current commercial resource base is not economic But at \$ 60/bbl, about 50% is economic



2016 cash flow break-evens





Twenty-two major projects and seven billion boe of commercial reserves delayed – that's the damage of the last six months. This represents the additional pre-FID projects and volumes we estimate have been deferred due to lower oil prices, on top of the of the 46 developments and 20 billion boe of reserves we identified in June 2015. The total tally now stands at <u>68 major</u> projects, containing 27 billion boe. And with oil prices dipping to new lows at the start of 2016 and capital allocation tightening, the list will continue to grow.


Key takeaways from the last six months:

- US\$380 billion of total project capex deferred (real terms), with US\$170 billion at risk from 2016 to 2020
- Deepwater hit the hardest: more than half of new project deferrals, up from <u>17 to 29</u>, and now 62% of total reserves and 56% of total capex
- 2.9 million b/d of liquids production deferred to early next decade, up from 2.0 million b/d in June
- Oil most impacted: deferred liquid volumes up 44%, versus 24% for gas
- Average breakeven (Brent, NPV10) of delayed greenfield projects is US\$62/boe




A growing impact on future oil production...

The production impact of these deferments is material in a global context. In the June update we estimated that delayed projects accounted for around 1 million b/d of liquids by 2021, rising to just under 2 million b/d by 2025. With more deepwater oil projects being pushed back, the impact six months later is significantly greater – by 2021 deferred volumes are at 1.5 million b/d, rising sharply to 2.9 million b/d by 2025.



In the short-term, around US\$170 billion (real terms) of potential investment over the next five years currently hangs in the balance, across the 68 projects. This represents 65% of the US\$260 billion we currently estimate will be spent on pre-sanction conventional developments globally over the same period. Most of the US\$170 billion is disproportionately weighted towards deepwater projects, given the scale of the up-front investment. By contrast, Canadian oil sands and large incremental investments in shallow-water and onshore projects have a more phased investment profile stretching mainly through the next decade.



Deferred pre-FID capex 2016-20 (US\$ billion, real) Deferred capex by country (US\$ billion, real)

The countries with the largest inventory of delayed oil projects are Canada, Angola, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Norway and the US. These six hold nearly 90% of all deferred liquids reserves. This includes oil sands, onshore, shallow-water and deepwater assets in both greenfield and incremental developments.

Angola



The same players that define the events and outcome


Oil is rapidly becoming a **BIG EVENT-DRIVEN** arena, difficult to forecast







Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Venezuela, Nigeria, South China Sea, Ukraine, Arctic











Enduring Allies from the past seem to change rapidly into coalition partners, while a number of opponents seem to become enemies





"Angola type cold war " in the Middle East: The battle over Syria will define the battle over Iraq, and hence the battle over the Middle East, and hence the position (survival) of the State Israel and Saudi Arabia in their conflict with Iran




What will the next president of the USA do?





China's Mandate: Not any longer sustainable !?





Dominant positions in price setting

LI FENG / CHINA DAILY


Chinese territorial claims give rise to escalating disputes in the South China Sea





Net oil and gas import/export shares in selected regions in the New Policies scenario






The world is upside down from 10 years ago



<u>10 years ago</u>






<u>Today</u>

Weak and disappointing / lower GDP growth Very strong US dollar (much lower oil imports) The fall of the BRIC Weak commodity currencies High deflation Negative interest rates Low commodity prices Lower global trade Low expectations Perceived risks > real risks Negative feedback loops



In the current economic environment oil prices can never move back to \$ 100/bbl on the basis of normal economic fundamentals ! Will it happen, then it will be a shock for the world economy

Will Wall street be a better agent than Saudi Arabia to manage the oil price and keep oil prices relatively low?




Oil prices have been pushed up by non-commercial investors, having made oil market more forward looking than historically has been the case

\$

Money managers' long and short positions in the three main crude oil futures and options contracts (million barrels) (NYMEX WTI, ICE WTI and ICE Brent)

Money managers' short positions and US oil prices in 2015/2016 Gross short positions in main NYMEX light sweet crude contract WTI front-month futures price



Managed money net length is at its highest pre-meting level since the June 2014 OPEC meeting, but gross long positions is higher today

.... Still, this price down cycle is similar to the 1980s


There is a good chance that this price down-cycle is similar to the 1980s, where it will take multiple years to work through oversupply and shale oil is profitable at \$65/bbl



Comparison of real oil prices, 1976 – 1986 (right axis) to 2005 – today (left axis)


Turning the corner and entering the vertical leg of the U-shaped oil price recovery (in tune with 1997 - 2001)









There is high uncertainty about the price of oil in 2018-2020



Oil prices in brackets are Brent 2018 price forecasts








Net new demand growth is not large enough to absorb all that gas; gas for coal substitution and head-on-head gas competition are needed

2017-2020: New LNG supply from Australia and North America could lead to an extended period of weakness in European gas prices





Will Russia allow US LNG to win market share in Europe and cause prices to stay low?



Will shale & renewables provide Europe with a perfect energy outcome?



Affordable (No excess rent)

Reliable (Security of supply)

Clean (Green & sustainable) Perhaps, as long as OPEC will not disappoint and Wall street can manage the oil price

Maybe, as real spare capacity is not there anymore, geo-political and geo-finance risks are high and the Energie and Öil Wende is a long journey

Yes, but step-by-step and expected to accelerate as gas comes back and electrification is there

Social Acceptance (A better world, to start locally)

Lots of ambition, high (moral) values ... but at the end we are also consumers







The views expressed in this report accurately reflect the personal views of Jan-Hein Jesse (JOSCO), the primary individual responsible for this report

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