



## International Trading Conference 2017

Organizers



### Inferring Energy Fundamentals through Price-Relationship Data

Hilary Till

Solich Scholar, J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities, University of Colorado Denver,  
<http://www.jpmcc-gcard.com/hilary-till;>

Research Associate, EDHEC-Risk Institute, <http://www.edhec-risk.com;> and


Principal, Premia Research LLC, <http://www.premiaresearch.com>



# Inferring Energy Fundamentals through Price-Relationship Data

- I. The Promise of Big Data
- II. The Reality of “Black Holes”
- III. The Wealth of Futures Price Data
- IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals
- V. Caveats on the Use of Price Data

The opinions expressed during this presentation are the personal opinions of Hilary Till and do not necessarily reflect those of other organizations with which Ms. Till is affiliated.



Source of Image: "From Field to Market," a painting by Gary Kelley, located in the CoBank Lecture Hall at the University of Colorado Denver Business School.

# I. The Promise of Big Data

- A. Algorithmic Trading
- B. Industry Cost Reduction
- C. Tapping the Value of Data Embedded in Industry



Source: Anderson (2017).

3



Business School

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO DENVER

J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities

# I. The Promise of Big Data

## A. Algorithmic Trading

Commodity trading is different from other asset classes in that new fundamental data that seemingly should impact prices (at least of certain tenors) is continuously coming at us, including:

- (1) geopolitical developments,
- (2) weather, (3) rig counts, (4) gasoline sales, (5) gas storage reports, (6) crude and product inventory reports, (7) oil and LNG tanker positions, and (8) power plant outages.



*Source: Anderson (2017).*




# I. The Promise of Big Data

## A. Algorithmic Trading (continued)

Perhaps no other asset class consistently receives as much new, material fundamental information into the market that needs to be assimilated.

Thus, the "bigness" of the data involved can potentially dwarf that of other asset classes, and the value of the high-tech analytics may hold great potential.



*Source: Anderson (2017).*



# I. The Promise of Big Data

## B. Industry Cost Reduction

Examples of the application of big data in the energy industry include:

(1) component failure prediction, (2) maintenance optimization, (3) transmission grid infrastructure management, and (4) oil and gas imaging and the prediction of geology and drilling results.

Improvements in these areas can have a dramatic impact on industry cost structure, as occurred during the shale oil revolution.

*Source: Anderson (2017).*

6



Business School

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO DENVER

J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities

# I. The Promise of Big Data

## C. Tapping the Value of Data Embedded in Industry

There is a wealth of data potentially available that simply is not collected currently.

For example, utilities have not historically kept highly time-granular records of electricity consumption.

Companies are looking at tapping this information.

As a result, energy companies serving retail customers could eventually see themselves as in effect, data and information companies.

*Source: Anderson (2017).*

7



Business School

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO DENVER

J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities

## II. The Reality of “Black Holes”

- A. In Emerging Markets
- B. Even in Some Markets in the U.S.



## II. The Reality of “Black Holes”

The preceding section mainly emphasized applications of big data in the U.S.

### A. In Emerging Markets



But with “emerging markets ... [becoming] increasingly dominant in the international economy, we have more and more ‘black holes’” in data coverage, explained Ed Morse, Global Head of Commodities Research at Citi in CFTC (2017).

“We know what [crude oil] inventories are ... in OECD countries ... We have a ... decent idea in some other countries; Saudi Arabia is very good for example at posting their inventories of products and crude oil, as is Brazil.”

*Source: [CFTC] Commodity Futures Trading Commission (2017).*

9



Business School

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO DENVER

J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities


## II. The Reality of “Black Holes”

### A. In Emerging Markets (continued)

“Even China, which produces a lot of statistics, has a lot of missing barrels, a lot of missing molecules, [and] a lot of missing tons of grains because their inventory [data] is a state secret.”

“So black holes are getting larger and larger and impacting our understanding of [commodity] fundamentals.”

Source: CFTC (2017).




10

## II. The Reality of “Black Holes”

### B. Even in Some Markets in the U.S.

Martin (2017) discussed how “Hurricane Harvey hit the Texas refining system hard”. As a result of the disruption to refinery crude processing, the J.P. Morgan commodities research team assessed the “cumulative loss of product supplied as ... 22 [million barrels] mb of gasoline and 20 mb of middle distillates ...”



## II. The Reality of “Black Holes”

### B. Even in Some Markets in the U.S. (continued)

“The majority of this shortfall will turn up in [U.S.] PADD 3 inventory levels in future weeks’ [Energy Information Administration] EIA reports.


However, some of this was destined for export markets, and some for shipment ... via pipeline to PADD 1 – so the impact will be dispersed *across several markets, not all of which will publish data that makes the true impact transparent, and thus, we continue to look at price signals as a guide for the underlying market dynamics,*” noted Martin (2017).

(Italics added.)



# III. The Wealth of Futures Price Data

- A. The Evolution of Pricing in the Oil Markets
- B. Petroleum Complex Futures Markets Provide Needed Transparency




# III. The Wealth of Futures Price Data

## A. The Evolution of Pricing in the Oil Markets

“The whole framework for commodities changes rapidly. Sometimes more rapidly than [what] you [would] think.”

The biggest change of all was “moving from fixed prices to market determined prices,” recalled Ed Morse in CFTC Talks (2017).




# III. The Wealth of Futures Price Data

## B. Petroleum Complex Futures Markets Provide Needed Transparency

Even when fundamental data on the oil markets are sparse or opaque, large-scale supply-and-demand shifts leave footprints in futures-price relationships, from which one can potentially infer the market's fundamentals.

In the presence of active futures markets, an observer need not be a member of a cartel or a large corporation to gain insights into the oil market.



Source: Till (2008).

15




Business School

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO DENVER

J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities

## IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

- A. Incentivizing Fundamental Behavior
- B. Driving Fundamental Behavior
- C. Proxying the Physical Market with Futures Spreads
- D. Understanding Chinese Demand (Through 2008)
- E. Managing the Domestic U.S. Crude Oil Surplus (2011 through 2013)
- F. The Market's Perception of the Marginal Cost of Production



## IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

### A. Incentivizing Fundamental Behavior

A futures trader interprets a commodity's price as part of a dynamic process. A commodity's price moves in whatever direction is needed in order to elicit a supply or demand response that will balance a commodity market.

It may be useful to review the technical aspects of this interplay.

*Source: Till (2008).*

17



Business School

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO DENVER


J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities

# IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

## A. Incentivizing Fundamental Behavior (continued)

### *Building Distillate Inventories Before Winter (1990 to 2016)*

This analysis is based on research work by Joseph Eagleeye of Premia Research LLC.




# IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

## A. Incentivizing Fundamental Behavior (continued)

### *Hurricane Katrina (2005)*

One can also look at the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005 for a good example of the dynamic interplay between an oil product's price and its supply-and-demand situation.

With the onset of Hurricane Katrina, the price of gasoline rallied 18% in four days before falling back about the same amount fifteen days later.



Source: Till (2008).


19

## IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

### A. Incentivizing Fundamental Behavior (continued)

*Hurricane Katrina (2005)*

(continued)



According to a 2005 *Dow Jones Newswire* report, “[Hurricane] Katrina shut in nearly all of oil and gas production in the Gulf of Mexico.

The large scale supply disruption and fear of an economic shock triggered a massive [domestic and international] government[al] response.”

This unprecedented governmental response caused gasoline prices to decline from their post-Katrina peak.

20

## IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

### A. Incentivizing Fundamental Behavior (continued)

*Hurricane Katrina (2005)*

(continued)

Further, and as also illustrated in the graph on Slide 19, with that response, fears of an economic slump diminished, which in turn caused deferred interest-rate contracts to decline, ...

... as the market resumed pricing in the expectation that the Federal Reserve Board could continue tightening interest rates at the time.




# IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

## A. Incentivizing Fundamental Behavior (continued)

### *Refinery Constraints (2008)*

The upgrading spread “will widen not only if there is a shortage of refinery capacity, but also if there is insufficient flexibility in the refining system to meet the demand for lighter products.”

Source: Ribeiro et al. (2009).



22



# IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

## A. Incentivizing Fundamental Behavior (continued)

*Refinery Constraints (2008)*

(continued)

“This was ... the case during the middle of [the first] decade, when refiners were using more marginal capacity and could not raise gasoline or diesel output without producing excess fuel oil.”

When markets are tight, prices increase “to provide the right incentives for both current production and *future investment*.” (Italics added.)

*Source: Ribeiro et al. (2009).*

23



Business School

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO DENVER

J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities

## IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

### A. Incentivizing Fundamental Behavior (continued)

*Refinery Constraints (2008)*

(continued)

And in fact, “the first half of 2009 [was to] represent ... the first large increase in refinery capacity additions,” observed Tchilingurian (2008), having previously noted that “oil refining capacity [had] peaked in 1981” in Tchilingurian (2006).

*Sources: Tchilingurian (2006, 2008).*

24



Business School

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO DENVER


J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities

# IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

## B. Driving Fundamental Behavior

*Hedging Opportunities  
(Particularly for Short-Cycle  
U.S. Light Tight Oil Projects)*

Goldman Sachs Equity Research (2016): “[A]s prices have trended higher[,] there has been a marked increase in hedging activity.”




# IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

## B. Driving Fundamental Behavior (continued)

### *Hedging Opportunities* (continued)

Morgan Stanley Research (2016):  
“History shows a 9-month lag  
between hedging and  
production ...”




# IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

## C. Proxying the Physical Market with Futures Spreads

*Example from 1997 to 2003*

Longson and Volynsky (2015):  
“Prompt [term] structure can be a good real-time proxy for the physical [oil] market, and the data proves that out.”

*Explanation of Abbreviations: NYMEX = New York Mercantile Exchange; OECD = Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; and M2- M1 = Second-Month Futures Contract Price Minus First-Month Futures Contract Price.*




27



## IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

### C. Proxying the Physical Market with Futures Spreads (continued)

*Example from 1997 to 2016*




*Notes on Graph: OECD Commercial Stocks (Excluding U.S. NGLs) in Days of OECD Demand Coverage vs. 3-Year Average (LHS) vs. 1-Month to 5-Year Brent Timespreads (% , RHS, Inverted).*

# IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

## C. Proxying the Physical Market with Futures Spreads (continued)

*Caveat: Inventories are Just Part of the Picture*




# IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

## C. Proxying the Physical Market with Futures Spreads (continued)

*Caveat: Spare Capacity Also Matters in Interpreting the Oil Futures Curve Shape*

A futures curve can be “backwardated” when there is no pressing need to incentivize precautionary stockholdings in oil.

In this state of the world, when the curve is in contango, this indicates that there is ample supply relative to near-term demand.



30




# IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

## C. Proxying the Physical Market with Futures Spreads (continued)

*Caveat: Spare Capacity Also Matters in Interpreting the Oil Futures Curve Shape (continued)*

When there is inadequate spare capacity, a futures curve needs to be in “contango” since there is a pressing need to incentivize precautionary stockholdings in oil.


In this state of the world, when the curve is in contango, this would indicate the risk of an eventual demand-destroying oil price spike, followed by a dramatic drop in the price of oil, such as in 2008. 31



# IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

## C. Proxying the Physical Market with Futures Spreads (continued)

*Caveat: Spare Capacity Also Matters*



Explanation of OPEC Spare Capacity from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA): "The extent to which OPEC member countries utilize their available production capacity is often used as an indicator of the tightness of global oil markets ... EIA defines spare capacity as the volume of production that can be brought on within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days. ... OPEC spare capacity provides an indicator of the world oil market's ability to respond to potential crises that reduce oil supplies."


## IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

### C. Proxying the Physical Market with Futures Spreads (continued)

*One More Caveat on Spare Capacity:*

*An Analyst Now Needs to Also Include Tight Oil Excess Supply, Not Just OPEC Spare Capacity*

Foreman (2017): “Although the OPEC swing producer model is outdated, excess productive capacity continues to correspond with prices.”



33




# IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

## D. Understanding Chinese Demand (Through 2008)

Stein (2005): “This is the first business cycle where Chinese demand is having a global effect on prices, notably of energy and other raw materials.”

The graph on the right provided an early indication of the structural changes to come in the commodity markets, and particularly, in the oil markets.




## IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

### D. Understanding Chinese Demand (Through 2008) (continued)

Through the summer of 2008, the heating-oil crack spread indicated extraordinary demand for middle distillates.

There were no severe weather events, supply disruptions, or large-scale trading blowups in the U.S. or Europe at the time, so it was not immediately apparent why this relationship should spike so extraordinarily.



Source: Till (2008).

35



Business School

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO DENVER


J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities

## IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

### D. Understanding Chinese Demand (Through 2008) (continued)

That is, except for news from China, including the devastating earthquake in Sichuan, China, which damaged power-supply grids, and also pre-Olympic petroleum-product stocking in order to ensure that there would be no shortages during the historic Beijing Olympics.

*Author's Source of Data:  
China Customs General Administration.*



## IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

### D. Understanding Chinese Demand (Through 2008) (continued)

Kaufmann and Ullman (2009) looked into where “innovations in world oil prices enter the market,” using data from 1987 through March 2008.

One of their results was that spot price for Dubai-Fateh oil had been a “‘gateway’ for innovations to crude oil prices.”

“A large fraction of the crude oil shipped to Asian nations from the Middle East (more than 10 mbd) uses the spot price for Dubai-Fateh as a benchmark ... As such, innovations in the spot price for Dubai-Fateh may [have] reflect[ed] increasing demand in Asia.”



## IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

### E. Managing the Domestic U.S. Crude Oil Surplus (2011 through 2013)

Blas (2011): “[F]rom time to time, the [WTI] contract [has] disconnect[ed] from the global oil market due to logistical troubles at its landlocked point of delivery in Cushing, Oklahoma.”

Two years later, Platts (2013) noted that “many pieces of the logistical puzzle” in North America were now falling into place, due to the “ingenuity of logistical engineers,” in managing the increase in U.S. domestic crude supplies.



## IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

### E. Managing the Domestic U.S. Crude Oil Surplus (2011 through 2013) (continued)

J.P. Morgan Commodity Research (2013) further explained that “[t]ruck, rail, and barge have all served to move the large increase in domestic crude supplies to U.S. refineries,” whom, in turn, could export petroleum *products* abroad.

This had been the mechanism for connecting the U.S. oil markets to global markets since exporting crude oil *itself* was illegal with some minor exceptions until December 2015.

## IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

### E. Managing the Domestic U.S. Crude Oil Surplus (2011 through 2013) (continued)

At the end of 2013, alert futures traders had an early signal that “the boom in ... [domestic oil] production ha[d] been well absorbed by existing U.S. infrastructure.”


Refinery margins (as represented by the 3:2:1 crack spread) no longer needed to consistently rally at the end of each month to provide an extraordinary return for transporting domestic crude oil, in whatever way possible, to U.S. refineries.

This observation is illustrated on the next slide with a graph that shows the degradation of performance of such a strategy, starting in late 2013.

40

## IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals

### E. Managing the Domestic U.S. Crude Oil Surplus (2011 through 2013) (continued)




*Notes on Graph: "A 3:2:1 crack spread reflects gasoline and distillate production revenues from the U.S. refining industry, which generally produces roughly 2 barrels of gasoline for every barrel of distillate. The 3:2:1 crack spread is calculated by subtracting the price of 3 barrels of oil from the price of 2 barrels of gasoline and 1 barrel of distillate," as noted in <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=1630>, accessed on October 12, 2017. Here, the 3:2:1 crack spread was calculated using these proportions, but then the total was divided by 3, thereby expressing the spread as per one barrel of crude oil. Further, the spread was calculated with the gasoline and heating oil nearby futures contracts and also with the WTI crude oil second nearby futures contract.*

# IV. What Futures Prices Reveal about Petroleum Complex Fundamentals


## F. The Market's Perception of the Marginal Cost of Production

“[T]he long-dated commodity price ...[is usually] a reflection of [a] ... commodit[y's] marginal cost of production ...”



## V. Caveats on the Use of Price Data

- A. Purely Technical Effects
- B. Not Predictions



## V. Caveats on the Use of Price Data


### A. Purely Technical Effects

#### *Dynamic Hedging*

“An additional ... factor is worth mentioning as it relates to the speed and magnitude of the oil price decline [in the Fall of 2014]: the impact of hedging unwinds.”

In October 2014, “Wall Street banks ... scrambled ... to neutralize their exposure to big oil options trades, adding to the downward spiral in crude prices as they s[old] futures contracts to offset options deals that ... [became] unexpectedly in the money.”

Sources: Cembalest (2015) and Ngai (2014).




## V. Caveats on the Use of Price Data

### A. Purely Technical Effects (continued)

#### *Liquidation Pressure*

Futures traders are also aware that the effects of traders having to liquidate large positions can be a temporary, but meaningful, driver of price.




This scenario illustrates another interaction effect between trades and price.

## V. Caveats on the Use of Price Data

### B. Not Predictions

CSIS: The “forward curve is not a good price predictor, but still functions well for hedging storage costs and requirements.”

Tchilingurian (2003): “Supply and demand determine spot prices, and inventory levels affect the difference between the price of oil today against the price tomorrow.”



# Conclusion

Instead of asking: do the fundamentals justify the oil price? ...

... this presentation adopted the view of a veteran oil futures trader and asked the opposite question: what is the price telling me about fundamentals?

The reason for this outlook is as follows: the market imposes sufficient discipline to prevent a trader from ignoring price but for a very short space of time!



# Acknowledgments

This presentation's analysis of the crude oil futures markets was jointly developed with Joseph Eagleeye of Premia Research LLC, <http://www.premiaresearch.com>.

Research assistance from Katherine Farren of Premia Risk Consultancy, Inc., <http://www.premiarisk.com>, is gratefully acknowledged.

The presentation has also benefited from helpful research from Hendrik Schwarz and Jan-Hein Jesse. Please note, though, that the ideas and opinions expressed in this presentation are the sole responsibility of Hilary Till.



# References

Anderson, T., 2017, Private correspondence, July 2. [T. Anderson is a member of the J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities' (JPMCC's) Research Council at the University of Colorado Denver Business School and is also the Content Director of the "Foundations for Commodities" Professional Education program at the JPMCC.]

Blas, J., 2011, "Commodities Daily: Changing Oil Benchmarks," *Financial Times*, January 11.

[CFTC] Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2017, "CFTC Talks: Andrew Busch, Chief Market Advisor, with Edward Morse, Global Head of Commodities Research, Citi," Washington, D.C., September 19. Available at: <http://www.cftc.gov/Media/Podcast/index.htm>.

Cembalest, M., 2015, "Hubbert's Valley: Consequences of an Unexpected Oil Price Decline," J.P. Morgan Asset Management, January.

De Souza, C. and M. Smirnov, 2004, "Dynamic Leverage," *Journal of Portfolio Management*, Fall, pp. 25-39.

Dow Jones Newswire, 2005, "Nymex Crude Tumbles as Output Recovers," September 6.

[EIA] Energy Information Administration, 2014, "What Drives Crude Oil Prices?," Slide Presentation, Washington, D.C., January 8, 2014.

Fenton, C., 2012, "On Estimating the Commodity Risk Premium," Slide Presentation, J.P. Morgan Commodities Research, May.

Foreman, R., 2017, "OPEC Policies, Production and Price Responses," Slide Presentation at EIA Workshop: Economic Activity and Oil Prices, Washington, D.C., September 19.

Goldman Sachs Economic Research, 2015, "Commodities and Currencies in the New Oil Order," March 20.

Goldman Sachs Equity Research, 2016, "The Rebalancing Act: It's Already Happened," Oil Gauge, October 11.

Goldman Sachs Commodity Research, 2016, "Oil: Bullish OPEC Agreement, Waiting on Details," November 30.

Hicks, B. and E. Smith, 2006, "Trends in Energy and Base Metals - Outlook for 2006," U.S. Global Investors, Inc., Slide Presentation, January 26.



# References

- J.P. Morgan Commodity Research, 2013, "Commodity Markets Outlook and Strategy: 2014 Outlook—And the Walls Come a-Tumblin' Down," December 30.
- Kaufmann, R. and B. Ullman, 2009, "Oil Prices, Speculation, and Fundamentals: Interpreting Causal Relations Amongst Spot and Futures Prices," *Energy Economics*, July, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 550 – 558.
- Longson and Volynsky, 2015, "Crude Oil: Beyond the S&D," Morgan Stanley Slide Presentation at Independent Petroleum Association of America Conference, June 25.
- Magnier, M., Spegele, B. and E. Yep, 2015, "Forecasting China's Oil Buying Grows Harder: Purchases for Stockpiles Appear to Skew Figures," *Wall Street Journal*, February 25.
- Martin, D., 2017, "Oil Market Weekly: Harvey Hurts WTI, Helps Brent – For Now," J.P. Morgan Commodities Research, September 8.
- Morgan Stanley Research, 2016, "Global Insight: \$80, Not \$60, Is the New \$90," April 18.
- Platts, *The Barrel*, 2013, "Tighter Brent-WTI Spread Raises New Challenges for Refiners," May 6.
- Ngai, C., 2014, "Banks Rush to Hedge Oil Option Deltas, Accelerating Rout," *Reuters*, October 15.
- Ribeiro, R., Eagles, L. and N. von Solodkoff, 2009, "Commodity Prices and Futures Positions," J.P. Morgan Global Asset Allocation & Alternative Investment Research, December 16.
- Stein, G., 2005, "World Oil Demand Revised Down Again," Lombard Street Research, World Service Daily Note, September 9.
- Tchilinguirian, 2003, "Stocks and the Oil Market: Low Stocks, Volatility, Price Levels, and Backwardation," International Energy Agency – Oil Industry & Markets Division Presentation, Berlin, September 19.
- Tchilinguirian, H., 2006, "Market Prices: What Do Oil Prices Say about Fundamentals: Presented to the 7th China Oil Traders' Conference," International Energy Agency Presentation, Nanjing, Jiangsu, China, April 18-20.



# References

Tchilingurian, H., 2008, "In Financial Turmoil, What Perspectives for Oil?" Oil Markets Outlook, BNP Paribas Corporate and Investment Banking, September 26.

Till, H., 2008, "The Oil Markets: Let the Data Speak for Itself," *EDHEC-Risk Institute Publication*, November. Available at: <https://www.edhec.edu/en/publications/oil-markets-let-data-speak-itself>.


Till, H. and J. Eagleeye, 2005, "Challenges in Commodity Risk Management," *Commodities Now*, September, pp. 45-50.

Articles by Hilary Till can be accessed here:  
<https://www.edhec.edu/en/corps-professoral-et-chercheurs/till-hilary>



# *Global Commodities Applied Research Digest*

For a complimentary subscription to the J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities' *Global Commodities Applied Research Digest*, please visit:  
<http://www.jpmmc-gcard.com/subscribe>.





Hilary Till, Contributing Editor,  
*Global Commodities Applied  
Research Digest*  
[<http://www.jpmmc-gcard.com>]



**GLOBAL  
COMMODITIES**  
APPLIED RESEARCH DIGEST

E-mail: [hilary.till@ucdenver.edu](mailto:hilary.till@ucdenver.edu)



**Business School**

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO **DENVER**

**J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities**